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University of Central Florida
Orlando, Florida
This database analysis was conducted to determine which factors, or combination of factors, play a part in creating
an unwanted outcome due to surprising or unexpected events encountered by pilots. The purpose of this study was to
identify likely precursors to perceived surprising and unexpected events and, to advance our understanding of the
overt  behaviors  and misbehaviors  found in  response  to  these  events.  This  study also  sought  to  determine  if  there
were any significant differences between commercial air carrier and general aviation flight operations in regard to
surprising and unexpected events. The results of this study indicated that the involvement of surprise or
unexpectedness can indeed have a detrimental effect on the outcome of the flight. We also found indicators of the
processes and mechanisms leading from surprise to an unwanted outcome.
Introduction
It is widely accepted that aircraft accidents, incidents,
and events can result from novel and catastrophic
unexpected situations. One need only look back at
recent history for examples of fatal accidents that
resulted from highly unusual situations such as US
Airway’s Flight 427 near Pittsburgh (National
Transportation Safety Board, 1999), Alaska Airlines
Flight 261 off the coast of Southern California
(National Transportation Safety Board, 2000),  and
American Airlines Flight 587 in New York (National
Transportation Safety Board, 2001). However,
Kochan, Breiter, and Jentsch (2004) found surprising
and unexpected events need not be rare, unusual, or
catastrophic. Quite the opposite, pilots often describe
normal, everyday occurrences as surprising or
unexpected. They concluded that typical or
normal events that occur daily (or nightly) in flight
operations can also be surprising or unexpected
to pilots.
This study builds upon previous research (Kochan,
Breiter, & Jentsch, 2004) that identified what factors,
conditions, and situations pilots and other users of the
National  Airspace  System  regard  as  surprising  or
unexpected. With this database analysis, we sought to
deepen our understanding of surprise and
unexpectedness by determining what underlying
factors are present in situations that pilots deem
surprising or unexpected. We asked: Are there certain
factors, or a combination of factors, that are more
likely to be present in situations where an unexpected
event has a harmful effect on the outcome of the
flight? Can seemingly trivial, everyday events, if
surprising or unexpected to the pilot, produce an
unwanted outcome?
Background
Research suggests that a person becomes surprised
when their expectations are inconsistent with reality
by an amount higher than could reasonably have been
expected from the cues available and utilized by the
individual (Kochan, Breiter, & Jentsch, 2004;
Reisenzein, 1999). Expert pilots are normally able to
process large amounts of information quickly and
accurately, while continually and seamlessly
modifying their situation awareness (Endsley, 2001;
Wickens, 2002; Orasanu & Martin, 1998). However,
decision making performance might be impaired,
when pilots are confronted with events that do not
adhere to expected schemata (Wickens, 2002;
Endsley, 2001). Unexpected or surprising events may
cause a disruption in cognitive processes (Reisenzein,
1999) leading to a decision making delay. This
decision making delay lasts until the inconsistency,
between what was expected and reality, is analyzed
and integrated into the pilot’s situation awareness
(Meyer, Reisenzein, & Schützwohl, 1997).
Reisenzein (1999) found that the more unexpected an
event, the more significant this disruption in
cognitive processes.  The extent to which this
potential interruption of cognitive processes occurs in
the  task  of  flying  may  influence  the  outcome  of  a
particular maneuver or even the entire flight. It was
with this assumption that the following database
analyses were performed.
Purpose of Study
The purpose of this study was to determine (a) what
factors or combination of factors are present in
unexpected and surprising events; (b) find out to
what  extent  these  factors  influence  the  surprising  or
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unexpected event; (c) discover if there is a
relationship between types of factors and severity of
outcomes ranging from merely an event to a fatal
accident; and (d) determine if there are any
significant differences between commercial air
carrier and general aviation flight operations, in
regard to surprising and unexpected events.
Method
Search Procedure and Databases
Four databases (Table 1) were electronically keyword
searched for the words “surprise” and “unexpected.”
Reports not relevant to this study were discarded. For
example, if a reporter stated that, “it was not
unexpected that…” or, if the reporter communicating
the surprise or unexpectedness was not involved in
the reported event (e.g. they were not a user of the
National Airspace System) then the report was
discarded. Also, reports submitted more than once
were not included in the analysis. This study
analyzed 638 reports.
Table 1. Databases Reviewed for this Study.






















NTSB and AIDS reports are created as a result
of an accident or incident investigation. ASRS and
ASAP reports are compiled through voluntary
reporting programs.
Report Analysis Procedure
Two aviation psychology researchers holding civilian
flight instructor certificates reviewed the reports. Each
report was examined for 71 variables. The variables
selected for investigation were chosen to ascertain the
location and environmental conditions surrounding the
reported event, the demographics and experience level
of the reporter, the type of aircraft, type of flight
operation and purpose of flight, the factors
surrounding the surprising or unexpected event, and
the effect of the surprising or unexpected event on the
outcome of the flight. The results from each report
were coded and recorded into the Statistical Package
for the Social Sciences (SPSS) v. 11.5.
Factors Surrounding “Surprise” and “Unexpectedness”
In addition to collecting data regarding the
background and conditions of each surprising or
unexpected event, each report was also reviewed for
the presence of 35 factors (Table 2) believed to be
involved with surprising and unexpected events.
Table 2. Factors Associated with Unexpected or
Surprising Events.
Other’s Surprise at Pilot’s
Actions



























Other Aircraft – Taxi
Other Aircraft – Departure
Other Aircraft – Enroute




These contextual factors were selected for analysis
because past research found them to be associated
with surprising and unexpected events (Kochan,
Breiter, & Jentsch, 2004). They were also selected
because of their historical and reoccurring
involvement in aviation events, incidents, and
accidents. The task of this study was to determine if
relationship exists between these factors, or a
combination of these factors, and the manifestation of
surprise and unexpectedness.
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The Effect of Surprise and Unexpectedness
An important aspect of this study was to determine to
what extent surprise and unexpectedness contributes
to aviation events, incidents, and accidents. In this
regard, each report was analyzed to discover what
relationship existed between the involvement of
surprise or unexpectedness and the outcome of the
resulting event, incident, or accident. Following
Helmreich, Klinect, & Wilhelm’s (2001) model of
threat and error management, if the report of surprise
or unexpectedness had no effect on the outcome, then
the surprise or unexpectedness was deemed
inconsequential.  If  the  report  of  surprise  or
unexpectedness had an impact on  the  outcome,  then
the surprise or unexpectedness was determined to be
consequential.  If  the  report  of  surprise  or
unexpectedness had a worsening effect on the
outcome, then the surprise or unexpectedness was
recorded as having exacerbated the situation.
The surprise or unexpected occurrences were then
evaluated for their impact on the outcome of  the
flight; normal, reportable event (no damage or
injuries), incident (damage and/or injuries less than
accident threshold), or accident (substantial damage
and/or significant injuries).
Results
A  thorough  look  at  these  data  indicated  that  the
factors did not correlate adequately to perform a
factor analysis. The factors and their frequency and
percent occurrence in the reports are listed in Table 3.
Table 3. Factors Most Frequently Involved with
Surprising and Unexpected Events by Frequency and





Aircraft Position 420 65.8
Air Traffic Control 326 51.1
Other Crewmember Actions 270 42.3
Aircraft State 202 31.7
System Status 123 19.3
Automation 95 14.9
Inflight Turbulence 74 11.6
Low Visibility 64 10.0
Delays 62 9.7
Airport Contstruction 60 9.4
Other Aircraft - Enroute 60 9.4
Chi-Square tests for independence were conducted to
evaluate the differences between the results of the
unexpected or surprising event and the outcome of
flight as displayed in Table 4.
Table 4. Event Outcome vs. Flight Outcome by
Percent within Outcome of Flight (n=638).
Outcome of FlightResult of Event
Normal Event Incident Accident
Inconsequential 8.2 10.5 21.5 9.2
Consequential 21.3 34.0 18.5 18.4
Exacerbated 70.5 55.5 60.0 72.4
Chi-Square tests for independence were also
conducted to find which factors involved in
unexpected and surprising events were significantly
different between events, incidents, and accidents,
displayed in Table 5.
Table 5. Relationship between Factors and Severity








































p = .003 (  =.150)
10.9 16.9 6.9
Other Aircraft – Enroute
X2(3, 634=13.45),





p = .004 (  =.144)
5.5 3.1 4.6
A Chi-Square two-way contingency table analysis
was conducted to evaluate which factors involved in
unexpected and surprising events were significantly
different between air carrier and general aviation. The
results of these analyses are displayed in Table 6.
400
Table 6. Differences in Factors in General Aviation







X2(1, 631=30.0), p < .001
2.4 14.2
Aircraft Position
X2(1, 630=19.34), p < .001
57.9 74.6
Temporary Flight Restrictions
X2(1, 631=13.11), p < .001
0.6 5.4
Wind Takeoff
X2(1, 631=9.84), p = .002
0.3 3.7
Wind Enroute
X2(1, 631=11.54), p = .001
1.2 6.1
Other’s Surprise at Pilot’s Actions
X2(1, 630=7.04), p = .006
5.4 11.5
Illusion or Disorientation
X2(1, 631=7.95), p = .005
5.1 11.1
Landing Gear Position
X2(1, 631=5.64), p = .018
1.5 4.7
Airport Construction
 X2(1, 631=5.80), p = .016
6.9 12.5
Other Aircraft – Departure
X2(1, 629=3.99), p = .046
3.3 6.8
Holding
X2(1, 630=4.51), p = .034
3.0 0.7
Aircraft State
X2(1, 631=5.18), p = .023
35.8 27.4
Aircraft Alerting Device
X2(1, 631=8.04), p = .005
11.3 5.1
Inflight Turbulence
X2(1, 631=11.56), p = .001
15.8 7.1
Automation
X2(1, 631=16.44), p < .001
20.3 8.8
Other Crewmember Actions
X2(1, 631=91.52), p < .001
60.0 22.3
Discussion
This study revealed that there is a relationship
between the involvement of a surprising or
unexpected event and the severity of the outcome of
the flight (Table 4). In 72.4% of the accidents
reviewed for this study, the involvement of surprise
or unexpectedness did exacerbate the situation. On
the other hand, the surprising or unexpected event
was found to be inconsequential in only 9.2% of the
accidents. We can see from Table 4 that in all
‘outcome of flight’ categories the surprising event
was more likely to exacerbate the situation than not.
Therefore, regardless of the ultimate outcome of the
flight, surprise very often has a worsening effect on
the situation. Interestingly, Table 4 shows that in
70.5% of the surprising or unexpected events that
resulted in a normal outcome, the surprise or
unexpectedness also exacerbated the situation. This
category represents situations where surprise
worsened the situation, but the flight continued
normally never having crossed the event, incident, or
accident threshold. This suggests that the occurrence
of  surprising  or  unexpected  events  might  be  a  more
nominal part of flight operations than previously
thought. It is likely that the vast majority of
surprising or unexpected events that end in normal
outcomes go unreported.
This study found several factors which tend to be
involved in more severe (incident or accident) flight
outcomes (Table 5). It is interesting that the factor
‘other crewmembers actions’ is strongly associated
with more severe flight outcomes. As would be
expected, further analysis of this factor revealed it is
more strongly associated with air carrier than general
aviation operations. Further study into this area is
needed to determine the nature, extent, and
implications of the problem.
Results of this study also indicated that there are
many types of surprising events in aviation. The fact
that there are no consistent patterns of these events
occurring suggests that potentially any event or
combination of events can produce a situation which
can end in an unwanted outcome as exhibited in the
following examples.
Aircraft Position and Confounding Events. Findings
from this study support research by Hoeft, Kochan,
and Jentsch (2005) which revealed the flawed nature
of the current NOTAM system. In this study, pilots
repeatedly described the NOTAM system, which
disseminates Temporary Flight Restriction (TFR)
information, as unclear and difficult to use. This
study found that TFRs are more of a general aviation
problem than an air carrier problem (Table 6). In the
example below, the pilot was conscience of nearby
restricted airspace. However, an unexpected system
malfunction contributed to the pilot’s loss of
awareness of the aircraft position and inadvertent
penetration of a TFR. Aircraft Position was the most
frequently (65.8%) occurring factor in all of the
reports (Table 3).
They [ATC] were extremely busy and, I believe, were
working another plane with a call sign of X, but I
thought I heard a clearance. Near this time I
experienced an unexpected overload on my electrical
system and had to flip the battery switch to correct it.
This required me to reprogram my GPS which
contains the communications I was using. I was
unable to reach Orlando approach again and called
Kissimmee tower. I had veered west and was
attempting to circle south of the Disney World TFR
and come back to the approach on runway 15, the
runway in use; I was in contact with Kissimmee
tower as I joined the approach. If I violated the TFR
it must have been at this point. I was cleared to land
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by Kissimmee tower and landed on runway 15. I was
advised that I had violated the Disney World TFR.
(ASRS Report Number 578835 – Event)
Air Traffic Control Actions and Landing Traffic.
ATC instructions or actions were found to be a factor
in 326 or 51.1% of the reports reviewed for this study
(Table 3). ATC instructions were more likely to be
involved in events than incidents or accidents (Table
5). The following is an excerpt from an ASRS report
submitted by a corporate jet pilot describing a hurried
departure in marginal weather at a busy airport. Note
that the controller advised the crew to be ready for
takeoff. A takeoff clearance while holding for
departure usually would not be regarded as
surprising. However, after analyzing their situation
this crew was convinced that an immediate takeoff
was unlikely and therefore were “surprised” and
rushed into a potentially dangerous departure.
The controller advised us to be ready to go. We
acknowledged ok. And then, there was about a 3
minute break in the arriving traffic. Nothing
happened. No takeoff clearance. We were spring
loaded to go and then nothing happened. Finally, out
of the clouds pops another aircraft on final. As I
watched him get closer, I realized that we weren’t
going to be released. I relaxed, my copilot relaxed.
Big mistake. Tower cleared us for an immediate
takeoff. You can’t even begin to imagine our total
surprise. Both crew and engines weren’t spooled up
to go. As we were turning the corner for a rolling
takeoff, tower comes back and asked if we were
rolling! As soon as we replied affirmative, the
controller sent the arriving aircraft around. The
controller wasn’t happy, the arrival wasn’t happy
and I wasn’t happy. (ASRS Report Number 598909 –
Event)
Going-Around the Automation. The  go-around  is  a
maneuver intended to be used when an approach or
landing needs to be discontinued. By its very nature,
a go-around is not generally a pre-planned maneuver.
However, pilots should be prepared for a go-around
at any point during an approach (Federal Aviation
Administration, 1999). Go-around was found to be a
factor in 52 or 8.2% of the reports. Automation issues
found in 14.9% of the cases (95) combined with the
go-around maneuver increases the surprise factor.
The following ASRS excerpt reveals that flight crews
are not always ready to perform a go-around and an
unexpected go-around can result in potentially
dangerous situations.
The aircraft was stabilized on approach and spacing
with other traffic appeared to be comfortably spaced
on TCAS II. Crossing the FAF at 2800 feet, the tower
controller issued a clearance to climb to 4000 feet
and to turn left to 360 degrees. I did not hear clearly
the call sign on the clearance. I looked to the FO and
asked him to verify the clearance being for us. My
hands were on the flight controls as I was ‘following’
the autopilot on the approach. As the FO verified the
clearance, I selected ‘TOGA’ mode of flight
automation and proceeded with the normal GAR [go-
around] callouts. Selecting TOGA automatically
disconnected the autopilot and established nearly full
power on both engines. As I was not looking directly
at the flight instruments when selecting TOGA, the
very rapid increase of power caused the aircraft
pitch to increase past the desired attitude of 15
degrees to an attitude of 20 degrees, or possibly
slightly higher. Although I instinctively placed
forward pressure on the flight controls to counter the
rapid change in pitch, the pressure was insufficient to
stop the pitch at the desired attitude. In an attempt to
smoothly lower the nose in the interest of passenger
comfort, the aircraft experienced a 1 or 2 second
stick shaker warning as we leveled at 4000 feet.
Contributing factors: 1) An unexpected condition: an
unexpected GAR at an unexpected phase of flight, 2)
automation which contributes to large surprise
factor: large and rapid power change in engines well
below the wing creating an instant pitch change, and
then disconnecting the autopilot. 3) The selection of
TOGA at a time when concentration was not firmly
established on flight instruments. (ASRS Report
Number 575644 – Event)
Sixteen factors were found to have significantly
different rates of occurrence in general aviation and air
carrier operations (see Table 6). Wind on landing was
the most influential, significant factor between general
aviation and air carrier operations (x2 (1,631) = 30.0 p,
<.001). This finding supports a recent study by the FAA
which reported that wind accounted for 46.3 percent of
all the FAR Part 91 weather related accidents between
1991 and 2001 (Federal Aviation Administration, 2001).
In addition, wind on landing was strongly associated
with more severe flight outcomes (Table 5).
Other Aircraft. Pilots often cited the sudden presence
of other aircraft as surprising or unexpected. Other
aircraft were a factor in 168 or 27.6% of the reports.
Often poor traffic scanning on the part of the pilot
contributes to situations where other aircraft appear
suddenly.  Interestingly, the presence of other aircraft
enroute was a factor in 60 or 9.9% of the reports,
more  than  any  other  phase  of  flight.   In  the  ASRS
report below the pilot was busy configuring his
aircraft for departure and not focusing his attention
outside the aircraft while taxiing for takeoff.
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While completing the [before takeoff] checklist, I
heard the aircraft calling ground stating that they
were clearing runway 19 onto taxiway D, which was
ideal for him since taxiway D leads into the airline
terminal ramp. As I looked up in surprise and shock
(at that moment I realized I didn’t check the runway
for traffic), the ERJ was turning off with all exterior
lights still on, which caused temporary blindness.
(ASRS Report Number 598235 – Event)
Conclusions
This study established that surprising and unexpected
events can and do have a negative effect on the
outcome of flight. We found several factors that are
consistently involved in surprising and unexpected
events. We also determined what flight outcome each
factor is likely to be involved with. However, a
simple formula explaining what combination of
factors,  are  more  likely  to  cause  a  surprising  or
unexpected event resulting in an unwanted outcome
remains allusive. Perhaps the most important finding
from this study is that potentially any factor or
combination of factors can create a surprising or
unexpected event that leads to an unwanted outcome.
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